Abstract. We consider extensions of Peano arithmetic which include an assertibility predicate. Any such system which is arithmetically sound effectively verifies its own soundness. This leads to the resolution of a range of paradoxes involving rational agents who are licensed to act under precisely defined conditions.
Paradoxes of rational agency
Let S be a recursively axiomatized formal system that interprets Peano arithmetic (PA). The soundness of S is characterized by the scheme Prov S A(n 1 , . . . ,n k ) → A(n 1 , . . . , n k ) (
("if A is provable within S, then A"), with A ranging over the formulas of the language of S. Here n 1 , . . . , n k are the free variables of A,n is the nth numeral, A is the Gödel number of A, and Prov S A is some standard arithmetical formulation of the assertion that A is a theorem of S.
The assertion that S is consistent is effectively the special case of ( * ) when A is any sentence which is provably false in S. Thus, according to Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, if S is consistent then it cannot prove any such instance of ( * ). Indeed, Löb's theorem asserts that if S is consistent then it can only prove Prov S A → A when it can prove A.
The inability of a rational agent who reasons within S to affirm the soundness, or even the consistency, of S is an unhappy but familiar phenomenon. However, in a recent paper [5] Yudkowsky and Herreshoff observe that this phenomenon carries a sharper sting in the context of an AI that is licensed to act under precisely defined conditions. Thus, imagine an intelligent machine M that is capable of reasoning within S and is licensed to perform some action α 0 when it has verified the truth of some sentence A 0 . We now describe a variety of situations, mostly adapted from Section 3 of [5] , in which M is paradoxically unable to justify performing α 0 even though it intuitively ought to be able to do so.
1.1. Naturalistic trust. Suppose M decides to improve its performance by constructing an assistant M ′ whose job is to prove theorems for M . M programs the assistant to reason within the same system S that M reasons in, and to alert M when it has proven the sentence A 0 (or any other sentence which expresses an actionable criterion for M ).
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The paradox is that even though M knows that M ′ reasons within S, it cannot act on the information that M ′ has proven A 0 . Knowing this tells M only that A 0 is provable in S, not that A 0 is true, and lacking the soundness scheme ( * ) it cannot infer A 0 from Prov S A 0 . In fact nothing M ′ can tell M , short of a line by line account of the actual proof, could convince M that A 0 is true. So apparently the best M can do in this situation is to retrieve the formal proof of A 0 from M ′ and check it line by line, thereby establishing A 0 to M 's own satisfaction and licensing the action α 0 .
The puzzle here is that M knows perfectly well what the outcome of this verification is going to be, but still has no way to get around executing it in its entirety. Löb's theorem prevents M from "trusting" an agent in its environment, even granting that M has perfect knowledge that the agent reasons correctly within S.
1.2.
Reflective trust. Alternatively, there can be situations in which it might be relatively easy for M to prove the statement Prov S A 0 , and even to produce an algorithm which provably generates a formal proof of A 0 , but unfeasably difficult for M to actually execute that algorithm. The formal proof of A 0 might be astronomically long, for example, even while the proof that it can be constructed is quite short. Again, M finds itself in a situation where it "knows" that it can prove A 0 , but is unable to act on this knowledge without first performing some tedious or even unfeasable computation whose result is known in advance. Evidently M cannot even trust itself.
The paradoxes of naturalistic and reflective trust are both straightforward expressions of M 's inability to affirm the soundness scheme ( * ), and both of them could be easily handled by modifying its licensing criteria. All we have to do is to program M so that whenever it accepts a sentence A as a license to perform the action α, it also accepts Prov S A as a license to perform α. This would allow it to act on the knowledge that A is provable -knowledge that it might derive on its own or obtain from an outside source -without actually possessing a proof of A. Next we present two additional difficulties which cannot be handled in this way.
1.3. Reflectively coherent trust. Suppose the actionable condition has the form (∀n)A 0 (n). It could be the case that M is able to prove each instance A 0 (n), yet not able to prove the quantified statement (∀n)A 0 (n).
So far, there is nothing worrisome about this possibility. It could easily happen that each instance A 0 (n) is verifiable by a finite computation, yet there is no uniform reason why A 0 (n) is true for every n. (Think of assertions like "the first through nth digits in the decimal expansion of π do not contain a string of 100 consecutive 9's".) But suppose in addition that M knows that for each n it can prove A 0 (n). That is, suppose M has proven the sentence
Without knowing that S is sound, M cannot go on to infer the condition (∀n)A 0 (n) which allows it to act.
Yudkowsky and Herreshoff ask whether it is possible to design the formal system S in a way that evades this problem. That is, can S have the property that whenever (∀n)Prov S A(n) is a theorem of S, it is also the case that (∀n)A(n) is a theorem of S?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. No consistent recursively axiomatized system which interprets Peano arithmetic is reflectively coherent in this sense. For let S be any recursively axiomatized system which interprets PA. We claim that we can prove, in S, the statement (∀g)Prov S A(ḡ) where A(g) is a standard arithmetization of the assertion "g is not the Gödel number of a proof in S of 0 = 1". This is done as follows. Reasoning informally in S, we argue that for each g, either g is not a proof of 0 = 1, in which case this fact can be verified by a mechanical finite computation and hence is trivially provable in S, or else g is a proof of 0 = 1, in which case S is inconsistent and therefore proves anything. (This argument appears in [1] , Section 2 (d).) Thus, reflective coherence would entail that S can prove its own consistency, contradicting Gödel's second incompleteness theorem as improved by Rosser.
However, it still seems reasonable to expect M to be able to accept a proof of (∀n)Prov S A(n) as licensing the same actions that are licensed by a proof of (∀n)A(n). The point here is that agreeing to accept Prov S (∀n)A(n) as a licensing condition, as proposed above, does not accomplish this. We should also note that the issue is no longer about feasability: it may simply be impossible for M to convince itself that (∀n)A(n) holds, despite knowing that (∀n)Prov S A(n) .
1.4. Disjunctive trust. Finally, suppose the actionable condition is the sentence A 0 and we follow the suggestion made above to program M to also accept Prov S A 0 , Prov S Prov S A 0 , etc., as licensing the same action. This does not accomodate the possibility that M might prove the sentence A 0 ∨Prov S A 0 . (This formulation of the disjunctive trust problem was suggested to me by Cameron Freer.) Intuitively, the preceding sentence tells us that either A 0 is true, which licenses action, or else A 0 is provable and therefore true, which also licenses action. So A 0 ∨ Prov S A 0 "should" license action, but it does not. We cannot straightforwardly infer either A 0 or Prov k S A 0 for any k. A natural idea is to augment S with a truth predicate. This would enable us to formalize the reasoning we just used which allowed us to infer the truth of A 0 from the provability of A 0 ∨ Prov S A 0 . The problem is that self-applicative truth predicates are inconsistent, whereas a non self-applicative truth predicate would only apply to reasoning carried out in the original system, not the augmented system. Thus M could still find itself in a situation where it has proven that it can prove A 0 , but is unable to infer A 0 because the anticipated proof of A 0 makes use of the truth predicate. A partially self-applicative truth predicate a la Kripke would not do any better; by Löb's theorem it is simply impossible to consistently augment S in any way that would enable us to generally infer A from Prov S + A , where Prov S + refers to provability in the augmented system S + . As we have seen, the paradoxes of reflective coherence and disjunctive trust are not resolved by broadening the licensing criteria so that Prov S A licenses any action that A licenses. There can still be provable assertions which ought to license actions but do not. Another possibility is to simply ignore the provability predicate for licensing purposes; that is, program M so that whenever A licenses α, so does any sentence which reduces to A when all provability predicates are removed. But this idea is a non-starter because provably true sentences can become false when provability predicates are removed. For instance, we can prove in PA that Prov PA Con(PA) → Prov PA 0 = 1 (if PA proves its own consistency, then it is inconsistent) but after removing the provability predicates this becomes Con(PA) → 0 = 1, i.e., ¬Con(PA).
What we need is a principled method of broadening some initially given licensing criteria that goes beyond merely accepting Prov A in place of A.
Formalizing assertibility
We propose to handle the paradoxes of rational agency using the notion of assertibility -more precisely, rational or warranted assertibility. This is a philosophical term which is supposed to identify a property of sentences that expresses our right to assert them. The idea is that a sentence is assertible if it has a perfect rational justification or "warrant". In a mathematical context the warrant may be thought of as a proof, in the semantic sense of argument that provides a perfect rational justification, not in the syntactic sense of formal proof within some formal system. In intuitionism the word "provability" is used in the former sense, and thus for our purposes is synonymous with assertibility.
One could object that this notion of assertibility or provability is either altogether meaningless, or at best too vague to support precise analysis. A philosophical argument can be made against this objection, but perhaps the best answer is to simply exhibit a formal treatment of assertibility. An axiomatization was given in [2] ; it goes as follows. Let be a predicate symbol which represents "is assertible" and is to be applied to Gödel numbers of sentences in some language (which, crucially, might itself employ the symbol ). There are five axioms for ,
A → B → A → B , and one axiom scheme, capture, which states (6) A(n 1 , . . . , n k ) → A(n 1 , . . . ,n k ) for every formula A. Intuitionistic logic is to be used; we do not assume that the law of excluded middle holds for formulas which involve .
There is no separate axiom for negation. We treat negation as a derived symbol, such that ¬A is an abbreviation of A →⊥ where ⊥ is some canonical falsehood such as 0 = 1.
The justification for these axioms is discussed in detail in [2] . The main points are that the logic is intuitionistic and that the release principle A → A is not included. Excluded middle is suspect because we cannot a priori assign truth values to all statements of the form A : if putative proofs can refer to each other, such that the validity of one hinges on the validity of the other, then there is a potential circularity issue which could make the assignment of truth values problematic. Similarly, whenever we have actually proven that a sentence A is provable we ought to be able to rationally infer A, but the implication A → A is suspect because it globally affirms the validity of all proofs, including proofs in which it itself might have been used, creating another circularity issue.
(The capture scheme is constructively valid because we can simply stipulate that any proof of A must be recognizable as a proof. Thus, any proof of A can trivially be converted into a proof that A is provable.)
A surprising feature of the operator is that it can be applied self-referentially without producing a contradiction. For example, consider a sentence L that says of itself that it is not assertible. Thus, we have L ≡ ¬ L . Then we can make the following deductions. First, assuming L lets us immediately infer ¬ L , and it also lets us infer L via capture. Thus L entails a statement and its negation, so we may conclude ¬L. We can further deduce ¬L . However, there is no contradiction here. In particular, we cannot proceed to infer ¬ L , only the weaker statement L → ⊥ . We do not merely claim that simple attempts to derive a contradiction fail. We can actually give consistency proofs for systems which allow the formulation of assertibility versions of the liar paradox and Russell's paradox ( [2] and [4]; see also [3] ). See also Theorem 3.2 below.
It is interesting to note that including either the law of excluded middle or a release axiom scheme would make assertibility reasoning paradoxical. If we knew L → L, then together with ¬L, which we just proved, we could infer ¬ L . But that is equivalent to L, so we would have proven both L and ¬L, a contradiction. Or again, if we knew L ∨ ¬ L then we could reason as follows. First, assume L . Since we have already proven ¬L, we also have ¬L . This yields L ∧ ¬L , and a short argument then gives us ⊥ . On the other hand, if we assume ¬ L then, as above, we can infer ⊥ and from this ⊥ . Thus, if we had the law of excluded middle then we could prove ⊥ . So excluded middle forces us to affirm a contradiction.
Self-verifying systems
In what follows we employ intuitionistic logic and take ⊥ to be the formula 0 = 1. Systems using classical logic can be accomodated by including all instances of the law of excluded middle as non-logical axioms. Thus, for example, we treat Peano arithmetic as an intuitionistic system but include as non-logical axioms all formulas of the form A ∨ ¬A with A a formula of first order arithmetic.
It is convenient to exclude formulas with free variables from our formal proofs. Thus we require all axioms to be sentences and we express the generalization deduction rules as the implications
(whenever n 1 is not free in A) and
(whenever n 1 is not free in B). The only deduction rule we need then is modus ponens in the form given (∀n 1 , . . . , n k )A and (∀n 1 , . . . , n k )(A → B), infer (∀n 1 , . . . , n k )B.
In this section we assume S is a recursively axiomatized theory in the language of first order arithmetic which extends PA. Define a formal system S as follows. Its language is the language of first order arithmetic enriched by a single unary relation symbol . Fix a Gödel numbering for this language. The main axioms of S consist of the universal closures of
• the non-logical axioms of S, • all instances of the induction scheme and the logical axiom schemes for formulas in the language of S , and • all of the axioms (1) -(6) for given in the last section, for the language of S . (For details on how one would formalize, e.g., axioms (3) and (4) for , see Section 2 (c) of [1] .) Also, let Ax(g) be a formula in the language of first order arithmetic which expresses that g is the Gödel number of one of the main axioms. We can assume that whenever Ax(ḡ) holds this is provable in PA. Besides its main axioms, S has one additional jump axiom given by the formula (∀g)(Ax(g) → (g)).
Let Prov S (g) be a standardly expressed formula stating that g is the Gödel number of a theorem of S . (Recall that in our setup every theorem is a sentence.) We now show that S verifies its own soundness in the sense that it proves a single statement which affirms that every theorem of S is assertible. 
(assertible soundness) and Con(S ) (assertible consistency) are provable in S .
Proof. Working in S , we know from the jump axiom that we have (g) whenever g is the Gödel number of one of the main axioms. Also, if B is the jump axiom itself then we can use capture to infer B . So we can show, in S , that (g) holds for any g which is the Gödel number of any of the axioms of S .
Still working in S , we proceed to prove (g) whenever g is the Gödel number of any sentence that is provable in S . Given any proof of such a sentence, we inductively verify (g ′ ) as g ′ ranges over the Gödel numbers of the lines of the proof. Given the result of the preceding paragraph, we just have to show how to handle deduction via universally quantified modus ponens. We do this with deductions of the form
(assuming here only one universal quantifier for the sake of notational simplicity). This completes the proof of assertible soundness. For assertible consistency, recall from Section 1.3 that S proves the statement (∀g)Prov S A(ḡ) where A(g) arithmetizes the assertion that g is not the Gödel number of a proof in S of 0 = 1. By assertible soundness we can infer (∀g) A(ḡ) , and then using box axiom (4) we can infer (∀g)A(g) , i.e., Con(S ) .
Using Gödelian self-reference techniques it is not hard to write down a sentence in the language of S which says of itself that it is not assertible. But as we discussed earlier, no contradiction results. We will now prove that S is consistent, provided S is sound (i.e., the axioms of S are true statements of first order arithmetic).
The systems described in [2] and [4] also included the release principle in the form of a deduction rule which allows the inference of A from A . The justification for this rule is that whenever we have actually proven that A is assertible we should be entitled to assert A. Thus, having accepted a system that does not employ the release rule we can successively accept proofs that employ one use of the rule, then proofs that employ two uses, and so on.
In the present paper we exclude the release rule because it complicates Theorem 3.1: Prov S A would no longer imply A , it would imply k+1 A where k is the number of uses of the release rule in a proof of A. However, the point stands that proofs of not only A, but also A , A , . . ., all affirm "trust" in the semantic content of A. Proof. We define a sequence (F i ) such that each F i is a set of sentences in the language of S . Intuitively, these are sentences that we determine to be false. The definition proceeds by recursion on i, and for a given value of i by recursion on the complexity of a sentence. Fixing i, we define F i as follows. The atomic sentences have the form t = t ′ and (t) where t and t ′ are numerical terms (i.e., they contain no variables). Put t = t ′ in F i if t and t ′ numerically evaluate to different numbers, and put (t) in F i if t evaluates to the Gödel number of a sentence that belongs to F i−1 . We do not place any sentence of the form (t) in F 0 .
Place A ∧ B in F i if either A or B belongs to F i ; place A ∨ B in F i if both A and B belong to F i ; place (∀n)A(n) in F i if A(n) belongs to F i for some n; place (∃n)A(n) in F i if A(n) belongs to F i for all n. Place A → B in F i if for some j ≤ i we have A ∈ F j and B ∈ F j .
It is easy to see that
It is tedious but straightforward to verify both that no axiom of S belongs to F and that the complement of F is stable under universally quantified modus ponens. Thus no theorem of S lies in F . But every false sentence of first order arithmetic belongs to F 0 , so k A belongs to F k for every k ≥ 1. So none of these statements can be a theorem of S .
It is easy to see that consistency of S implies consistency of S ; any model of S can be extended to a model of S by letting (g) hold for all g. However, mere consistency of S is not sufficient to guarantee that 0 = 1 is unprovable in S . For example, take S to be PA + ¬Con(PA). Then Theorem 3.1 shows that S proves Prov S 0 = 1 → 0 = 1 , but we can also infer Prov S 0 = 1 from ¬Con(PA) ≡ Prov PA 0 = 1 , so that 0 = 1 is a theorem of S .
Resolving the paradoxes
We propose the following uniform resolution of the paradoxes of rational agency discussed in Section 1. First, we require agents to reason within systems that have an assertibility predicate satisfying the axioms for and for which we are able to prove a version of Theorem 3.1. This addresses their inability to affirm the consistency and soundness of their own reasoning. We also impose the following licensing rule.
Box rule: Whenever a sentence A licenses some action α, the sentence A also licenses α.
The resolution of the paradoxes is now simple and straightforward. Whenever Prov S A is a theorem, so is A . Therefore, according to the box rule, knowing that A is provable is always just as actionable as knowing A. This handles naturalistic and reflective trust. For reflectively coherent trust, observe that
provably in S . So (∀n)Prov S A(n) is just as actionable as (∀n)A(n). Finally, disjunctive trust is handled by the inference
which shows that A ∨ Prov S A is just as actionable as A. Do we get too much? For instance, is Prov PA Con(PA) → Prov PA 0 = 1 just as actionable as Con(PA) → 0 = 1? No, because the implication Prov S A → A only goes in one direction, and besides, we cannot bring an implication inside the box operator. So there is no way to remove the provability predicates in this case.
We do not mean to imply that rational agents should be required to work in the language of first order arithmetic. That is merely a convenient vehicle for the results we proved in Section 3, but all kinds of formal systems are amenable to augmentation by an assertibility operator. For instance, a version of Theorem 3.2 for ZFC should be provable under the assumption that inaccessible cardinals exist.
Self-modifying AI
We have not yet addressed the main concern of [5] , which involves a rational agent who is seeking not a license to perform a particular action, but general permission to delegate the performance of actions to a second agent. This is more difficult because the first agent does not merely have to sanction the second agent's judgement that some particular action has been licensed, as in the naturalistic trust paradox. Rather, the first agent is required to globally affirm the correctness of any such judgement the second agent might make.
The same issues appear in the case of an intelligent machine that is considering modifying its own source code (in order to make itself more intelligent, say). Before doing this it would want to be sure that its post-modification state will reason correctly, i.e., any theorem it proves after the modification should actually be true. This runs into the familiar Löbian difficulty that the agent is not even able to affirm the soundness of its pre-modification reasoning.
One way to deal with this problem is to forbid the second agent from performing any action, reducing it to the role of a theorem proving assistant. By allowing the second agent only to think, not to act, we effectively convert the problem into a type of naturalistic trust question that we already know how to handle. In the self-modification scenario this could amount to putting a restriction on which parts of the machine's source code it is allowed to rewrite.
If one insists on allowing the second agent to act the problem becomes much harder. In Section 4 of [5] , two constructions are presented of an infinite sequence of independently acting agents, each of whom can give a provable justification for activating the next one, yet none of whose deductive power falls below an initially prescribed level. The constructions are clever but they have a nonstandard flavor. Probably this is unavoidable, unless the problem description were to be altered in some fundamental way. In the remainder of this section we present another solution which uses nonstandard assertibility reasoning.
We begin by setting up some formalism. Enumerate the possible actions the first agent M 1 can take. Let S be a base system that uses the language of first order arithmetic augmented by some additional relation symbols. We assume that using these extra symbols it is possible to formulate an expression Act M1 (n) which represents the event that M 1 takes the nth action. Also let Γ be a propositional symbol (i.e., a nullary relation symbol) which represents the event that some desired goal G is achieved. Next, we augment S by introducing an infinite sequence of constant symbols (κ i ) together with, for each i, the axiom κ i = κ i+1 + 1. Call the resulting system S * . It is clear that if S is consistent, then so is any finite fragment of S * , and therefore so is S * . Although its language is slightly richer than the language used in Section 3, we can still augment S * with an assertibility predicate to get a new system S * in the manner described there. We assume that versions of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 hold for S * .
Following [5] , we impose a condition that M 1 only acts if it can prove that doing so will achieve G. This licensing criterion could be formalized in S by the formula Act M1 (n) → Γ, but we weaken it by inserting an assertibility operator to require
for the first agent, Act M2 (n) → κ2 Γ for its successor agent, and so on. Thus the condition which describes when M 1 acts is (∀n)(Act M1 (n) → Prov S * Act M1 (n) → κ1 Γ ). Now assume that M 1 can prove the corresponding condition (∀n)(Act M2 (n) → Prov S * Act M2 (n) → κ2 Γ )
that describes when M 2 acts. Since M 1 will not activate M 2 unless it can trust that M 2 will achieve G, we also assume that M 1 can prove
wheren 0 indexes the action of activating M 2 ; that is, M 1 knows that if M 2 is activated then it will act in some way. (This could be trivial if we know there is a brute force method of achieving G and want M 2 to look for an efficient method. Alternatively, we could alter the definition of G so that, say, an exhaustive search which fails to find any way to accomplish the desired goal, counts as an acceptable outcome.) In order to license activating M 2 , we must prove the sentence Act M1 (n 0 ) → κ1 Γ . This can be done as follows. Working in S * , combine (1) and (2) to get , and so on. All of these agents reason within the same formal system S * , but they respond to different licensing criteria. The licensing criteria appear to become stricter for later agents, which is why each M i is able to accept the validity of actions performed on the basis of M i+1 's licensing criteria. However, since the κ i do not have definite values the criteria for M i and M i+1 are effectively equivalent.
A possible intuition is that κ 1 is some unspecified very large number. This seems like a fairly reasonable intuition for a formal system that is admittedly nonstandard. As we mentioned earlier, it seems unlikely that there is any standard solution to the problem of delegated action as it is currently posed.
The licensing criteria for the M i do not respect the box rule. That could be accomodated by introducing transfinite degrees of assertibility and accepting j Act Mi (n) → κi·ω Γ for any value of j as a license for M i to execute the nth action. But we do not pursue this direction.
